Report by: Mohamed Osman
With South Sudan’s ratification of the Entebbe Agreement, the legal quorum for establishing the Nile Basin Commission is complete. The Commission’s establishment procedures will commence 60 days after South Sudan deposits its ratification documents with the African Union.
Five countries have already signed the agreement: Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and Burundi. Part Three of the agreement stipulates that at least six countries must ratify the agreement for the Commission, which will be headquartered in Uganda, to be established.
This agreement raises concerns for Egypt, as it does not recognize its share of the Nile waters, estimated at 55.5 billion cubic meters annually.
This report will shed light on the transformations taking place in the Nile Basin region and the agreements signed since the colonial era, culminating in the Entebbe Agreement, which is based on the Nyerere Principle signed in the 1960s. It will also examine the position of the downstream countries affected by the agreement.
The Nile Basin
In its broadest definition, the Nile Basin encompasses 11 African countries, whose population constitutes 40% of the continent’s total population. The basin is comprised of three main sub-basins:
The Eastern Nile Basin, which includes Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia, and contains the Blue Nile and several tributaries.
The Equatorial Lakes Nile Basin, which includes the Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya, Uganda, Egypt, and Sudan. This basin includes Lake Victoria, one of the world’s largest lakes and a major source of the White Nile.
The Southern Nile Basin, which includes South Sudan and parts of Uganda and Kenya. This basin includes the Sobat River, a tributary of the White Nile.
The Nile is the longest river in the world, stretching 6,650 kilometers. The Nile Basin covers an area of 3.4 million square kilometers, and the Nile and its tributaries flow from south to north.
The Roots of the Conflict
The current struggle over the Nile Basin is not a recent phenomenon, but rather has deep roots in the history of the African continent, linked to the European scramble for its colonization and division since the infamous Berlin Conference of 1885.
It began with the 1891 Protocol, signed between Britain and Italy on behalf of Egypt, Sudan, and Eritrea, respectively. This expanded to include the countries colonizing the Nile Basin states, culminating in the 1929 Nile Waters Agreement.
The 1929 Agreement is considered one of the most important agreements in the Nile Basin. It granted Egypt a guaranteed share of the water, known as the acquired right or “historical right.”
The agreement also granted Egypt the right to object to any project built on the Nile if it deemed it detrimental to its water security. Between these two agreements, numerous treaties and agreements were signed by European colonial powers on behalf of the African countries under their control.
Post-Independence Agreements
1959 Agreement This was the first agreement signed between two independent states, Egypt and Sudan. Several other Nile Basin countries, which had not yet gained independence, did not participate in this agreement. These included Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi, which gained independence in 1962, and Kenya, which gained independence in 1963.
The agreement was motivated by a number of projects planned by both countries. Egypt was planning to build the Aswan High Dam, while Sudan was negotiating to build the Roseires Dam. The agreement increased Sudan’s share of the Nile waters from 4 billion cubic meters to 18.5 billion cubic meters, while Egypt was granted 55.5 billion cubic meters.
The Position of the Upstream Countries
The Nile Basin countries, with the exception of the downstream states of Egypt and Sudan, maintain a firm stance against the agreements concluded before they became independent. Their main objections are:
1. The agreements were crafted by colonial powers, and these countries were not party to them. Furthermore, they did not endorse or join these agreements after independence, and therefore, they are not binding upon them.
2. The agreements granted Egypt absolute control over the Nile waters without regard for the other Nile Basin countries.
3. The agreements disregarded the rights of the other basin countries and their need to utilize and benefit from the Nile waters, as well as their current and future development needs.
This is the source of the disagreements regarding how to address the Nile water issue and reach common ground, particularly between Egypt and Ethiopia. Despite cooperation on some joint projects at the basin level, the disputes between Egypt and Ethiopia have significantly impacted the overall approach within the group.
The Nyerere Doctrine
The Nile Basin countries adhere to the “blank slate” doctrine, or Nyerere Doctrine, which states that countries formerly under colonial rule had no role in concluding treaties during the colonial era and therefore do not recognize those agreements.
The upstream countries adopted this doctrine to absolve themselves of the obligations of agreements concluded during the colonial period and formulated a different phrase to express the principle of “equitable utilization,” which was later adopted by the Entebbe Agreement.
This doctrine also aligns with the 1997 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, which calls for a legally binding framework that specifies the details of resource use and mechanisms for dispute resolution between states.
The Development of Joint Regional Frameworks for the Nile Basin
The Hydromet Initiative (1967) This initiative was prompted by the significant rise in the water level of Lake Victoria in the early 1960s, which led to severe flooding and damage along the lake’s shores.
The World Meteorological Organization, in collaboration with the United Nations Development Programme and with support from Egypt, studied the possible causes of the significant rise in the lake’s water level. The initiative included data collection, modeling, and analysis, as well as training staff to understand rainfall and surface runoff in the upper basin.
Through the implementation of the initiative, known as Hydromet, data was collected over a 25-year period, and staff from all member countries were trained.
Equally important, the organization established a The Hydromet Forum allows member states to discuss various technical issues related to the development of the Nile River.
Although all Nile Basin countries participated, Ethiopia was not. Some basin countries expressed concerns that Egypt and Sudan might use the data collected for future planning, which weakened trust among the nations.
The Andogo Initiative (1983) was an informal cooperative initiative proposed by Egypt. Because of its informal nature, it was named “Andogo,” a Swahili word meaning brotherhood.
The initiative aimed to discuss Nile water issues, agriculture, resource development, and to promote economic, technical, and scientific cooperation among the riparian states. Sudan, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Central African Republic, all outside the Nile Basin, initially agreed to participate. Burundi, Rwanda, and Tanzania later joined, while Kenya and Ethiopia remained observers.
The initiative served the group as an institutional hub for exchanging experiences and fact-finding, but it failed to meet the needs of stakeholders due to the lack of binding regulations. Furthermore, some Nile Basin countries accused Egypt of not adhering to the initiative and insisting on implementing massive irrigation and land reclamation projects without consulting the other basin states.
The Transitional Initiative (1993): Following the failure of the Andogo Initiative, the Technical Cooperation Committee for the Promotion of Development and Environmental Protection of the Nile River, known as TECONEL, was established. It was founded by Egypt, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, with other riparian states participating as observers.
TECONEL was intended as a three-year transitional plan, with the hope that a permanent institution at the basin level would be established upon its expiration. Some viewed it as a new arrangement that circumvented Egypt’s political dominance in the Andogo Initiative. However, TECONEL focused on technical aspects, similar to the Hydromet Initiative, which discouraged other countries from joining.
The Cooperative Framework (1997)
The Nile Basin countries established a cooperation framework in 1997 to promote integrated management, sustainable development, and the harmonious use of the basin’s water resources, as well as their protection for current and future generations. This framework included the establishment of a permanent mechanism, the Nile River Commission, to facilitate and strengthen cooperation among member states.
The Nile Basin Initiative (1999)
Consultations continued regarding ways to sustain cooperation and establish a permanent mechanism. In 1995, the Nile Basin Commission took the first crucial step by adopting the Nile Basin Action Plan, supported by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), which included approximately 22 projects.
In 1996, a forum for legal and institutional dialogue was established to address the complex legal and political challenges related to the Nile River.
In 1997, the Nile Basin Commission partnered with CIDA, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the World Bank, which was also tasked with leading and coordinating donor activities to support the establishment of a basin-wide consultative mechanism.
In 1998, the Nile Basin Technical Advisory Committee approved proposals concerning the “Guidelines for the Nile Basin Initiative Policy” and the “Action Plan for Establishing the Nile Basin Initiative.” The Nile Basin Initiative was officially launched in February 1999 and signed by nine of the basin countries.
The Entebbe Agreement and New Frameworks
In an effort to bridge the differences among the basin countries, the Committee of Experts remained in session between 1997 and 2000. The Committee submitted a draft proposal for a cooperative legal framework among the basin countries, but Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia expressed reservations.
The Committee recommended the establishment of a subcommittee to discuss the proposed framework, called the Transitional Committee. All basin countries agreed to its formation, and it consisted of 18 members, with two members from each country except Eritrea, which participated as an observer.
The committee’s objective was to bridge differing viewpoints and reach a solution regarding the agreement prepared by the expert committee. However, after two years of work, the committee failed to achieve its goal of finding consensus on the disputed articles. Subsequently, a committee was formed in 2002 to negotiate the matter.
Its work continued until a draft Cooperative Framework Agreement was reached in 2007. At this meeting, it was agreed that the final meeting would be at the ministerial level, after which the agreement would be submitted to the level of heads of state.
Areas of Agreement and Factors of Division
The details and reports of the various committees confirm that the areas of agreement were substantial compared to the points of contention. The 1999 initiative reached agreement on over 90% of the agreement’s provisions. However, the Kinshasa meeting in 2009 contained the seeds of disagreement that ultimately led to the failure of all subsequent committees, from the technical committees to the ministerial committees.
Egypt and Sudan’s main reservations centered on preserving their historical and acquired water shares, or including a clause stipulating that no decision could be made without their consent. Ethiopia, for its part, objected to the issue of prior notification and the definitions of water security, while the other downstream countries insisted on refusing to consult on new projects along the Nile.
The countries began signing the agreement in 2011, which became known as the Entebbe Agreement. Ethiopia led the downstream countries in adopting this document, which marked a turning point from cooperation and joint action to a period of suspicion and conflict that could drag the Nile Basin countries into an uncertain future.
The concerns of the downstream countries, Egypt and Sudan, regarding the Entebbe Agreement:
Egypt and Sudan reject the Entebbe Agreement due to concerns about its negative impact on their Nile water shares. Both countries believe the agreement does not take into account their historical and vital needs. Instead, they call for negotiations to reach a comprehensive solution that guarantees an equitable distribution of water and preserves the rights of all riparian states.
1. Adherence to historical quotas: Egypt and Sudan rely on the 1929 and 1959 agreements, which grant Egypt approximately 55.5 billion cubic meters.
Egypt and Sudan receive approximately 18.5 billion cubic meters of Nile water annually. Both countries consider these agreements to represent historical rights that cannot be altered or superseded.
Any attempt to redistribute water under the Entebbe Agreement is seen as a threat to their historical water share, potentially leading to significant water shortages, especially for Egypt, which relies on the Nile as its primary water source.
2. Concerns about Upstream Projects: The Entebbe Agreement grants upstream countries (such as Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda) the right to construct water projects (like dams and irrigation projects) without prior approval from downstream countries (Egypt and Sudan). This raises concerns in Egypt and Sudan that such projects could reduce their water flow. For Egypt specifically, projects like the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) pose a direct threat to its water share, and the agreement raises concerns that Ethiopia might implement other projects without coordination.
3. Water Security: Egypt considers the Nile water issue a matter of national security, as more than 95% of its population depends on the Nile as its primary water source. Any threat to Egypt’s water share will significantly impact its food security, economy, and internal stability. Sudan, although in a better position than Egypt due to its other water resources, relies on the Nile for its agricultural and industrial development. Therefore, it too believes that any redistribution of water could negatively affect its interests.
4. Call for Negotiation and Consensus: The Entebbe Agreement seeks to abolish the historical privileges that Egypt and Sudan have enjoyed under previous agreements. Both countries consider this move unfair because it ignores Egypt’s heavy dependence on the Nile and the lack of alternative water sources compared to upstream countries that have multiple water resources.
5. Concerns about Complicating Regional Relations: Egypt and Sudan fear that implementing the agreement will complicate regional relations in the Nile Basin, potentially escalating tensions between upstream and downstream countries, which could affect regional cooperation and stability. 6. Resorting to International Mediation: Amid tensions surrounding the Entebbe Agreement and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), Egypt has specifically resorted to international mediation, whether through the United Nations or major powers such as the United States and the European Union, to pressure upstream countries to reach mutually acceptable solutions.
Gains Ethiopia Would Gain from Activating the Entebbe Agreement
Ethiopia is considered one of the most prominent beneficiaries of the Entebbe Agreement, and stands to gain several advantages if the agreement is activated, including:
1. Increasing its share of Nile waters: The agreement grants Ethiopia the right to utilize more Nile River waters without being bound by the historical quotas established in previous agreements, which allocate the largest share to Egypt and Sudan.
2. Implementing Water and Development Projects: Ethiopia will be able to implement its major water projects, such as the GERD, on a larger scale and without needing the approval of Egypt or Sudan. These projects enhance its capacity to generate hydroelectric power and support its economic development. 3. Strengthening its regional position: The agreement grants Ethiopia and other upstream countries greater negotiating power vis-à-vis Egypt and Sudan, thus enhancing their regional and political influence.
4. Agricultural and economic development: With increased utilization of Nile waters, Ethiopia will be able to develop its agriculture and achieve food security. It can also improve its infrastructure and develop its agricultural and industrial sectors.
Reasons and motivations behind South Sudan’s signing of the Entebbe Agreement
South Sudan signed the Entebbe Agreement for strategic reasons related to its national and developmental interests, as well as its relations with other Nile Basin countries. The most important of these reasons include:
1. Developmental needs: As a newly independent nation, South Sudan seeks to develop its infrastructure and its agricultural and energy sectors. Signing the agreement grants it greater freedom to utilize the Nile River’s resources to meet its developmental needs without being bound by previous agreements signed between Egypt and Sudan before its secession.
2. Water Resources Utilization: South Sudan possesses abundant water resources, and signing the agreement enhances its capacity to develop major water projects such as dams and irrigation projects, which can contribute to improved food security and energy generation.
Alliance with Upstream Countries: By joining the Entebbe Agreement, South Sudan aligns itself with upstream countries (Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania) seeking a more equitable redistribution of Nile waters. This step strengthens its relations with these countries and supports its regional stability.
4. Reducing Dependence on Egypt and Sudan: South Sudan’s signing of the agreement demonstrates its desire to reduce its reliance on previous water policies largely controlled by Egypt and Sudan. South Sudan aims for greater autonomy in its decision-making regarding Nile water management.
5. Pursuing Sustainable Development: South Sudan seeks opportunities for sustainable development, and making better use of Nile waters can contribute to improving living standards and developing the national economy. The agreement allows it to implement long-term development projects in cooperation with upstream countries. 6. Gaining International and Regional Support: By signing this agreement, South Sudan seeks to strengthen its position as an influential regional player and gain international support for development and infrastructure, particularly from upstream countries. Its signing also enhances its ability to negotiate international funding for development projects.
Potential for Military Confrontation Between Egypt and Ethiopia Due to the Entebbe Agreement
The possibility of a military confrontation between Egypt and Ethiopia due to the Entebbe Agreement coming into effect after South Sudan’s signing is considered unlikely, but not entirely impossible given the internal challenges in both countries: the internal political and economic challenges in Egypt and Ethiopia.
Due to the Entebbe Agreement
The possibility of a military confrontation between Egypt and Ethiopia due to the Entebbe Agreement coming into effect after South Sudan’s signing of it is considered unlikely, but not entirely impossible given the internal challenges in both countries. The internal political and economic challenges in Egypt or Ethiopia may push the governments to adopt more hardline stances on water-related issues as a way to divert attention from current domestic crises. Several factors, including the interests of countries like the US, China, and the EU, make a military clash less likely, despite existing tensions.
Despite Egyptian pressure on Sudan to create tension and the possibility of Egyptian military intervention in Ethiopia via Sudan, according to recent interpretations of Sudanese Foreign Ministry statements, the likelihood of a military clash between downstream countries is currently low.
The Entebbe Agreement did not completely transfer control of the Nile River’s resources to the upstream countries, but it represents a significant step towards strengthening the upstream countries’ position and increasing their ability to control how they utilize the river’s resources.
The agreement grants upstream countries greater autonomy in water project decisions without requiring prior approval from downstream states (Egypt and Sudan). This represents a shift in the balance of power, which has traditionally favored downstream countries under historical agreements.
While the possibility of military conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia exists, it is currently unlikely, as international and regional actors favor diplomatic solutions. However, should tensions over water quotas escalate or negotiations fail entirely, military options could become more viable, with potentially disastrous consequences for regional stability.
